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The Impact of Parental Wealth on Early
Living Standards in Israel1
Seymour Spilerman
Columbia University
This article examines the role of parental wealth as a determinant
of the living standards of young adults in Israel. Living standards
were examined in terms of four measures: home ownership, car
ownership, schooling after marriage, and a subjective evaluation by
the respondent. Israel is a strategic site for examining the interplay
between parental wealth and living standards because of the par-
ticular organization of its housing market. The study focuses on the
role of parental wealth in the early years of marriage because young
couples in Israel have great financial need at that time but are
liquidity constrained. The main finding is that, net of indicators of
parental SES and a couple’s own income, parental wealth plays a
substantial role in the living standards of young adults.
INTRODUCTION
There are two basic mechanisms by which parents transmit economic
advantage to their children: via investments in human and cultural capital
and through material assistance. Parental transfers in the form of so-
cialization and schooling have been intensively studied under the rubric
of the human capital/occupational attainment model (e.g., Becker 1975,
Blau and Duncan 1967). Parental transfers of material resources—inter
vivos gifts and bequests—have also been well documented, especially in
recent years (e.g., McGarry and Schoeni 1997; Cox and Rank 1992; Holtz-
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Eakin and Smeeding 1994). Little attention, however, has been given to
examining the consequences of the transfers for the well-being of offspring,
though see Oliver and Shapiro (1995), Wolff (1996), and Conley (1999)
for an important beginning.2 Even less consideration has been directed
to assessing the respective contributions to living standards from the two
transfer mechanisms, despite Becker’s (1981) insights into the subject.
The theoretical framework that is most developed for explaining a
family’s living standard is an outgrowth of research into labor market
attainment. Since the main determinant of attainment (measured by earn-
ings or occupational status) that is amenable to exogenous manipulation
is school achievement, much policy research has been focused on strategies
for improving educational performance, motivated by a desire to reduce
economic dependency and raise living standards, as well as to enhance
economic productivity in the population.
For most U.S. families labor market attainment is, indeed, the principal
determinant of economic well-being. Estimates of the proportion of house-
hold income deriving from labor market activity are in the neighborhood
of 84% (Lenski 1984, p. 188; Slemrod 1991). Further reinforcing the in-
clination of social scientists to focus attention on labor market issues, the
theoretical frameworks that have guided much stratification research (e.g.,
functional theory) have tended to emphasize the linkage between “services
performed” and social rewards—a formulation more attuned to explaining
inequality in society on the basis of labor market success than in terms
of inherited wealth or financial assistance from parents and relatives (Da-
vis and Moore 1945).
At the same time, there is a growing appreciation of the importance of
household wealth as a determinant of living standards and economic well-
being (e.g., Sherraden 1991, chap. 8; Spilerman 2000; Keister 2000). This
assessment comes from a recognition that wealth has attractive features
that make it a vital supplement to labor market rewards. In particular,
the income that derives from wealth does not require a trade-off between
leisure and work; also, unlike labor market earnings the income flow
continues in time of illness and unemployment. Moreover, if the income
generated from wealth holdings is taken in the form of capital gains, it
is taxed more lightly than earnings—the maximum rate on capital gains
is currently 15%, versus 35% for labor market income. Last, in times of
economic crisis the wealth principal can be consumed, which is hardly
the case with “human capital.”
2 There is also an earlier literature that explored some of the consequences of household
wealth for stratification issues; see especially Rumberger (1983) and Henretta and
Campbell (1978, 1980). These articles anticipated the more recent studies but were
limited by the paucity of household wealth data available to researchers at that time.
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Beyond the role played by household wealth in bolstering economic
security, wealth holdings contribute to living standards in several ways.
Household wealth can be held in a form that can be enjoyed (even as it
appreciates), such as a fine painting or a vacation home. Wealth reduces
the need to purchase life insurance, to save for retirement, or to offset a
possible economic crisis in the future, allowing a larger share of household
income to be directed to “lifestyle” expenditures. Even modest asset hold-
ings, used as a source of collateral, can facilitate entry into the credit
market, permitting a small business to be started or a home or car to be
purchased on the basis of a down payment and a bank loan.
The growing recognition of the importance of asset holdings has stim-
ulated new interest in the intergenerational transmission of wealth, along
with the subsidiary theme of the impact of parental transfers on the living
standards of offspring—witness the year 2000 election campaign debates
on estate taxation. It is the accepted wisdom that a substantial proportion
of current household wealth derives from parental transfers, though the
precise figure is in dispute (Modigliani 1988; Kotlikoff and Summers 1981,
1988). In policy discourse it is also recognized that a large transfer of
parental resources can give the recipient a leg up in the competition for
an attractive living standard, and this matter of “initial conditions” raises
issues of equity and fairness (Sen 1992). Yet, while much has been written
about the lifestyles of the super rich who subsist on large inheritances
(e.g., Mills 1956; Baltzell 1958), few studies have been carried out to reveal
how modest levels of parental transfers might affect the living standards
and attainments of offspring.3
From a theoretical point of view, an investigation into the impact of
parental wealth and intergenerational transfers on the life chances of
children raises critical issues in stratification research. While the impor-
tance of parental advantage has been well documented since the seminal
work by Blau and Duncan (1967), the parental resources examined in
these studies have largely been aspects of human capital—especially fa-
ther’s education and occupational attainment. The intergenerational
transfer of material resources, by comparison, has been problematic in
stratification theory, dating from the early functionalist formulations (e.g.,
Davis and Moore 1945); however, with the increase in asset holdings in
the U.S. population and in that of other Western countries since World
War II, its potential importance in the replication of inequality cannot be
ignored.
The intent of the present article is to examine the impact of parental
3 Some exceptions are the studies by Oliver and Shapiro (1995), Conley (1999), Kohli
(1999), Semyonov and Lewin-Epstein (2001), and Wilhelm (1996). See Spilerman (2000)
for a review of the literature on wealth and stratification processes.
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wealth on the living standards of young couples in the State of Israel.
Israel is a strategic site in which to investigate this matter because there
is reason to expect that household wealth plays a more considerable role
as a determinant of living standards in that country than in the United
States (see below). To the extent this is the case, the task of discerning
the ways by which parental wealth influences family well-being can be
more easily accomplished with Israeli data. However, as we suggest in
the concluding section, recent trends in the United States (the buildup of
household wealth, the prospective elimination of estate taxation, income
erosion among young families) are likely to make parental wealth in-
creasingly relevant to the determination of living standards in the United
States as well.
HOUSEHOLD WEALTH IN ISRAEL
There are several reasons why household wealth may have a greater
impact on living standards in Israel than in the United States.
1. The cost of maintaining what is considered by Israelis to be a min-
imally acceptable living standard is high, relative to median earnings.
Automobiles and household appliances, viewed by many as necessities,
are subject to steep import duties that can raise an item’s price substan-
tially in excess of its cost in Europe or the United States. The median
earnings in Israel, in contrast, is low. As a result, a considerable segment
of the middle class—not just poor families—consumes its monthly earn-
ings, restitution payments from Germany when available, and draws upon
assistance from family members in order to cover its living expenditures
(Plessner 1994, pp. 81–82). This existential situation was summarized some
years ago in the headline of an Israeli newspaper reporting results from
a consumer expenditure survey: “Income 2,800 Shekels, Expenditures
4,200 Shekels?” (Yideot Achronot 1991, p. 17).4
2. The wealth/income ratio in Israel is high. From a publication of the
U.S. House of Representatives (1992, pp. 1446, 1573) a net worth/income
ratio of 1.31 was calculated for the United States, based on median figures.
Israel has not conducted a wealth survey, but using the median value of
owner-occupied dwellings as a proxy for net worth, the corresponding
ratio is 4.30 (calculated from a Central Bureau of Statistics survey [1994a,
p. xiii; 1994b, p. 106]). While this computation pertains to home owners—
4 Similar expressions of mystification about family economics in Israel have appeared
in other sources. For example, in a New York Times article, Chartrand (1990, p. A4)
remarked: “The average combined salary for a two-income family of four [in Israel]
is . . . $1,400 a month. . . . The same average family spends $1,650 a month on basic
expenses, leaving a gap of at least $250.”
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73% of the population—even assuming that nonowners have zero net
worth the ratio would be 3.14, still more than twice the U.S. figure.5
To summarize: living expenses are high in Israel and the median salary
is low, but the majority of the population has considerable net worth,
relative to income, though much of this is tied up in home equity.
There are two further considerations that pertain, especially, to young
Israeli couples.
3. Israelis are home owners. Rental tenancy is not the norm and few
apartments are available for long-term rental. Some 73% of householders
own their residence, and much of the remaining tenancy is accounted for
by new immigrants residing in temporary quarters and by collective in-
stitutional arrangements such as kibbutz dwellings (Central Bureau of
Statistics 1994b, pp. xvi, 17).
What this means is that young Israeli couples must seek to purchase
a residence early in their marital career. Yet, apartments are expensive,
especially in the main cities. To ease the burden of acquisition the gov-
ernment offers subsidized mortgages to young couples (and to immigrants).
But the subsidies are small, unless one is prepared to reside in an un-
derdeveloped region of the country or, in recent years, in the disputed
territories of the West Bank (Elmelech 1992).6 Because large down pay-
ments are usually required and bank loans difficult to secure,7 young
couples—even young professional couples—face a liquidity constraint at
the time of marriage. This makes parental assistance critical if the couple
is to purchase housing, especially a residence in the more desirable, central
region of the country.
4. Tax policy in Israel. Despite a high tax rate on labor market earn-
ings—the top marginal rate was 50% in 1995, the date of the survey
examined in this study—capital gains has gone untaxed during most of
5 An earlier estimate of the net worth/income ratio, for 1963/64, was 2.61 (Central
Bureau of Statistics 1967, p. xxxix). This compares with a computed value of 1.27 for
the United States in 1962 (Projector 1964, p. 291; U.S. Bureau of the Census 1964, p.
339).
6 It is estimated that approximately 80% of settlers in the West Bank/Gaza reside there
because of the low cost of housing rather than for ideological reasons (Federal News
Service, “Hearing of the Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs Subcommittee of the
Senate Foreign Relations Committee,” October 15, 2003: http://www.lexisnexis.com;
and Heller 2002).
7 A recent account of housing mortgages in Israel noted: “Not so long ago a home
buyer could consider himself lucky if he got a mortgage amounting to 25% of the value
of the property; most would have gotten 15% or even 10%. And even this paltry sum
was conditional. The prospective mortgagor had to produce five guarantors . . . no
easy feat under most normal circumstances” (de la Roca 2000).
q2
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the country’s history;8 also, there is no tax on intergenerational transfers,
whether inter vivos gifts or bequests. Thus, wealth appreciation has been
treated more favorably in tax law than earned income (despite the
country’s socialist origins), and asset transfers are unimpeded by consid-
erations of taxation. This makes for a strong transmission of advantage
across generations, which tends to reinforce a major fault line in Israeli
society, between Ashkenazim (Israelis of European descent) and Mizra-
chim (Israelis of North African and Middle Eastern origin), analogous to
the racial divide in the United States. In Israel, the former are more
educated and have higher incomes and greater household wealth with
which to assist their children. (For details on the role of ethnicity in Israeli
life, see Kraus and Hodge [1990], Cohen and Haberfeld [1998], and Matras
[1980].)
The preceding account makes clear the importance of intergenerational
transfers in Israel and the life stage at which they are most consequential,
namely at time of marriage. For this reason the present article examines
the impact of parental wealth on several aspects of the living standards
of young couples in the years immediately following marriage. Particular
attention is given to the acquisition of a residence because this is a critical
step in the establishment of a new family. Early home ownership, more-
over, has been identified as an essential strategy in the accumulation of
household wealth and as a consideration in the intergenerational trans-
mission of advantage in both the United States and Europe (Mulder and
Smits 1999; Engelhardt and Mayer 1994; Hamnett, Harmer, and Williams
1991).
The data for the study come from the 1994–95 Survey of Families in
Israel, in which 1,607 respondents were interviewed on topics relating to
work behavior, income, wealth, assistance received from parents, and
views about financial obligations between parents and children. The data
cover the urban, Jewish population of the country; Israeli Arabs were
excluded because the basis of social obligation in that community is more
rooted in tradition and local village arrangements, and a different study
design would have been required to probe those intergenerational
linkages.
Additionally, to be included in the survey, respondents had to be in
their first marriage, with at least one spouse between the ages of 30 and
65, and at least one spouse having resided in Israel during the prior 10
years. A comparison between characteristics of the sample and the civilian
labor force in Israel (available from the author) reveals that except for
8 Israel recently amended its tax law. Beginning in January 2003 capital gains have
been taxed at a 15% rate.
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differences in the age distribution, which reflects the sample design, the
correspondence is quite close.
MOTIVATION AND ANALYTIC FORMULATION
Marriage is a critical time in the lives of young Israelis. Most marry shortly
after completion of military service, a four-year obligation for males during
much of the period covered by survey questions about the early marital
years. The accumulated resources of young couples therefore tend to be
modest, yet the financial demands of launching a new household are
considerable, especially the need to purchase and furnish a residence.
Because these expenses often exceed a young couple’s resources, newly
marrieds tend to turn to their parents for assistance. In Israel it appears
to be normative for parents to go to considerable lengths to provide fi-
nancial support, possibly in recognition of the reality that in the absence
of assistance their children’s living standards would be severely compro-
mised (Spilerman and Elmelech 2003).
Responses are reported in table 1 to three questions from the survey
that tap parental attitudes toward the provision of financial aid to adult
children. Question 1 is a scale item, assessing the perceived difficulty in
Israel of coping without financial support from parents. Fully 90% of the
sample believe that this is very difficult, if not impossible. Question 2
inquires about the duration of a parent’s financial obligation. Some 57%
of respondents believe that the obligation extends beyond a child’s mar-
riage year; indeed, until the time when assistance is no longer required.
Question 3 measures the force of the parental obligation. Some 45% of
respondents hold the view that it is a parent’s responsibility to fund the
bulk of a child’s home purchase costs—even if this means working longer
hours or accepting a second job.
The preceding is a rather strong expression of parental values and sets
the stage for investigating the relationship between parental assets—a key
ingredient in the ability to provide assistance—and the living standards
of young couples. Parental transfers can be provided in diverse ways:
loans, outright gifts, gifts contingent on the provision of services to parents,
assistance with particular purchases and with ongoing household ex-
penses. In the present article, however, we do not address the details of
the transfer process but focus instead on the impact of parental resources
(a measure of the capability to assist) on the outcome variables, aspects
of the well-being of offspring.
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TABLE 1
Parental Values in Regard to the Provision of Financial Assistance to
Adult Children
Parental Values Percentage
1. How important is it for parents in Israel to provide financial as-
sistance to their children? ( )Np 1,606
a. Impossible to manage without parental assistance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24.5
b. Extremely difficult to manage without parental assistance . . . . . . 38.5
c. Very difficult without parental assistance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27.2
d. Not very difficult to manage without parental assistance . . . . . . . . 8.1
e. Easy to get by without parental assistance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.7
Total . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 100.0
2. Until when, in your opinion, should parents provide financial sup-
port to their adult children? ( )Np 1,606
a. Until the child reaches age 18 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.7
b. Until the completion of military duty . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.6
c. Until the child leaves home . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7.5
d. Until the completion of studies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7.9
e. Until the time of marriage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15.0
f. Until the adult child no longer requires financial support . . . . . . . . 56.7
g. Other, don’t know . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.6
Total . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 100.0
3. In your opinion is it the responsibility of parents to carry the
main financial burden for the purchase of an apartment at the
time of a child’s marriage? ( )Np 1,595
a. Yes, even if this means that the parents have to work longer
hours or accept a second job . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45.1
b. Yes, but only if the parents have the financial means . . . . . . . . . . . . 51.0
c. No, it is the responsibility of the children to carry this financial
burden . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.9
Total . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 100.0
Dependent Variables
The living-standard variables cover some of the main dimensions of family
welfare: home and automobile ownership, formal education by either
member of the couple, as well as a subjective measure of well-being. All
questions were asked in reference to the first three years of marriage.9
Home and automobile ownership are dichotomous variables; formal ed-
ucation is coded “0”–“2”, a count of the number of spouses who attended
school during all or part of the three-year period. The subjective living-
standard variable is coded “1”–“5,” with “1” equal to much below the
9 A three-year interval was chosen because some decisions at marriage can require a
lengthy waiting period before realization. For example, even after a decision has been
made to purchase a home, a suitable residence must be found, or constructed, and a
bank mortgage arranged.
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average in Israel, and “5” equal to much above the average. The distri-
bution of responses on the four dependent variables is reported in ap-
pendix table A1. Excluded from the tabulation are 76 couples who were
married for less than three years at the time of the survey; the dependent
variables are considered to not be defined for these households.
Table 2 presents bivariate associations between the living standard
measures and a proxy for parental wealth—number of parental homes.10
In the case of each measure there is considerable sensitivity to the parental
asset variable. Yet, while the effects are strong, to build an explanatory
model it is necessary to control for other parental terms that are correlated
with the wealth proxy and could influence living standards. In particular,
there is a considerable literature that relates parental human capital to
children’s earnings (e.g., Jencks et al. 1972; Duncan, Featherman, and
Duncan 1972). Also, we want to ascertain the path of influence of parental
wealth: whether it is through the encouragement of educational attain-
ment and income of children or via direct monetary transfers. To accom-
plish this we utilize a multivariate formulation.
Explanatory Variables
The regressors of primary interest are of two sorts: variables that tap the
couple’s ability to finance a particular purchase from their own income
and savings and measures of a parent’s ability to assist with the expense
of an item. Regarding the couple’s own resources, we lack income data
for respondents in their early years of marriage. Moreover, were such data
available they would be of questionable utility, considering the range in
year of marriage in our sample—from 1949 to 1994—and the great var-
iation in the inflation rate in Israel during this period, from single digit
to values that exceeded 200% annually in the early 1980s. Instead, we
proxy household income in the early years of marriage by three variables:
husband’s education, number of spouses employed, and age of husband
at marriage. The last is intended to tap both the income returns to labor
market experience and the accumulated savings of the principal wage
earner.
The education variable requires special treatment. The measure of hus-
band’s education available to us (“EducH”) is years of schooling in 1995,
the survey year. Some 23% of husbands in the sample continued their
studies after marriage, either full-time or part-time; for them, the reported
schooling level probably overstates educational attainment at the time of
marriage. Rather than delete these observations, we correct for the mis-
10 The reason for selection of this proxy is explained below. The calculation of parental
homes is for husband and wife when each was age 16.
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TABLE 2
Bivariate Associations between the Living Standard Measures and Number
of Parental Homes
Living Standard Measure
(Years 1–3 of Marriage)*
Number of Parental Homes†
0 1 2
Home ownership (%) . . . . . . . . . . . 41.7 56.5 68.4
Auto ownership (%) . . . . . . . . . . . . 16.8 36.5 51.9
Number of spouses who stud-
ied after marriage (mean) . . . .28 .38 .58
Subjective standard of living
(mean) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.67 2.85 2.91
N . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 192 369 649
* Questions were worded in terms of “ever owned” or “ever studied” in this time period.
† Number of homes owned by parents when husband and wife were each age 16.
measurement by introducing an indicator variable—EducH (i)—coded
“1” if the husband continued studies after marriage and “0” if he did not.
With this coding, in the regressionb1
Depvarp b EducH b EducH(i) other terms e (1)1 2
reports the effect of husband’s education at time of marriage on a de-
pendent variable, while conveys the average additional effect fromb2
mismeasurement of the education term. A negative is expected andb2
would suggest that, where the husband continued his studies, the couple’s
reported living standard in the early years of marriage was below the
value predicted by the education term.
The measurement of parental wealth at time of marriage also poses
problems, not the least being the wide range in year of marriage and the
fluctuation in real asset values because of the changing rate of inflation.
But an even greater difficulty is posed by the immigrant background of
Israelis; many came from countries in Europe. Africa, and the Near East,
each with its own currency. With this complexity, it was decided that the
most reliable measure of parental wealth would be one based on asset
ownership, especially home ownership. The constructed proxy is “number
of homes owned by parents of husband and wife when each was 16.”
Cases where husband or wife did not live with a parent at this age—not
uncommon for immigrants who spent the World War II years in Europe—
were noted by an indicator term.
Other variables included in the study that may affect the receipt of
parental assistance are number of siblings of husband and wife, number
of living parents at the time of marriage, and husband’s and wife’s fathers’
occupational status (SES). The rationale for the first is that it measures
competing demands for the parental resources, while the parental status
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terms (measured by Vered scores—Kraus [1976]) serve as a proxy for
parental incomes and are introduced to obtain parental wealth effects that
are net of other sources of parental assistance.
Two additional sets of regressors warrant mention. Dummy terms were
added for year of marriage and for geographic region of origin: Israel,
Western Europe/United States, Eastern Europe, Africa (mainly Egypt,
Algeria, Morocco), and Asia (principally Iraq, Iran, Yemen). The former
were included because marital year correlates with the level of economic
development in Israel and may therefore tap the ability of parents in
different decades to make transfers. The latter terms permit a consider-
ation of the extent to which disparities among the ethnic groups in pro-
viding assistance to children can be attributed to differences in parental
resources.11 For convenience, we base the couple’s ethnic affiliation on
husband’s origin. Also, to better reflect cultural background, Israel-born
husbands were coded in terms of father’s country of birth. Thus, the
“Israel” ethnic category refers to couples in which both husband and
husband’s father were born in Palestine/Israel.
A final issue concerns the treatment of missing data. The amount of
missing data is not excessive for a survey that inquired about parental
characteristics at a time that, for some respondents, refers to the World
War II period (see appendix table A1 for details). Deletion of cases with
missing data is not recommended because of the loss of statistical power
and because, unless the missingness is completely at random (MCAR),
listwise deletion can generate biased parameter estimates (King et al.
2001). Instead, multiple imputation was employed with Schafer’s NORM
algorithm (Schafer and Olsen 1998).12 Formally, NORM requires the var-
iables to be multivariate normal; in practice, this imputation method
appears to also work well with categorical and dichotomous variables
(King et al. 2001; Schafer and Olsen 1998, p. 5).
Each imputed data set was constructed by filling in the missing data
with a regression prediction from other variables in the data set, to which
a random component had been added (DA algorithm)—See Allison (2002)
for details. Five data sets were created in this way using the NORM
program. The regression models were run with each data set and the final
coefficient estimates and standard errors calculated by pooling the esti-
11 See Semyonov, Lewin-Epstein, and Spilerman (1996) for an account of ethnic dif-
ferences in living standards in Israel.
12 It is well known that single imputation procedures for missing data, even with a
random component added, produce biased standard errors, generally inflating the value
of significance tests (Allison 2002, p. 29).
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mates using the formulas in Schafer and Olsen (1998). These are the
regression results reported in this article.13
The term for number of parental homes was treated differently. This
variable had been coded as missing in instances where a question about
home ownership was not applicable: e.g., the respondent grew up in an
internment camp after World War II or in a collective settlement in Israel.
Rather than impute ownership/rental status to these cases, an indicator
term was created. The indicator term was coded “1” for cases that lacked
data on parental home ownership and “0” otherwise. Analogous to the
discussion of equation (1), the coefficient of the indicator term conveys
the average effect of the cases that were missing parental ownership in-
formation, controlling for the other variables.
Regression results for the four living-standard measures are reported
in tables 3 and 4. Each measure was first regressed against the ethnic
terms and year of marriage (the “zero-order relationships”), then against
the full set of explanatory variables.14 Note that table 3 and column 1 of
table 4 report logistic models because the dependent variables are di-
chotomous, while the schooling regression (column 2 of table 4) is logistic
because the dependent variable is the proportion of members of a couple
engaged in study, based on a binomial outcome (0, 1, or 2 members in
school).15 The above regressions were estimated within the generalized
linear models (GLM) framework,
…g[E(y)]p b  b x  b x   b x , (2)0 1 1 2 2 n n
where the link function is logit, and the distribution family is specifiedg[ ]
as binomial ( ) for the initial two dependent variables and as binomialnp 1
( ) for the schooling equation. The subjective living standard re-np 2
gression (column 3 of table 4) was estimated with an ordered logit model
because of the ranked categorical structure of that dependent variable.
13 A comparison with the coefficient estimates using indicator terms for variables with
missing data showed little difference in results; in no case would a substantive con-
clusion be altered.
14 Only the full models are reported for the three dependent variables in table 4.
15 Use of a binomial formulation presumes that schooling decisions by husband and
wife are made independently, an assumption likely to be violated in practice. A si-
multaneous probit model was considered, which would permit the determinants of
husband’s and wife’s education to be modeled separately, but was abandoned because
of a lack of covariates necessary to identify the two equations. Ordered logit regression,
an alternative model specification, yielded similar results to the binomial formulation.
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TABLE 3
Determinants of Home Ownership in First Three Years of Marriage, Logistic
Regressions, Unstandardized Coefficients
Variable (1) (2)
Constant . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .371 (.267) 2.086** (.751)
Origin region:a
Western Europe . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .387 (.271) .269 (.283)
Eastern Europe . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .189 (.239) .019 (.249)
Africa . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .566* (.242) .231 (.258)
Asia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .086 (.242) .110 (.255)
Year of marriage (YOM):b . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1960–69 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .801** (.190) .670** (.200)
1970–78 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.100** (.184) .972** (.197)
1979–86 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .868** (.192) .590** (.209)
1984–94 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.077** (.202) .603** (.232)
Human capital/employment:
Education—husband . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .023 (.020)
Education—husband (i)c . . . . . . . . . . . . .093 (.146)
No. spouses employed in YOM . . . . .350** (.096)
Age of husband in YOM . . . . . . . . . . . .047** (.017)
Parental socioeconomic status:
SES husband’s father ( ) . . . . .2#10 .489 (.333)
SES wife’s father ( ) . . . . . . . . . .2#10 .014 (.323)
Parental resource terms:
No. parents alive in YOM . . . . . . . . . . .108 (.181)
No. parental homes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .444** (.087)
No. parental homes (i)d . . . . . . . . . . . . . .625** (.178)
No. brothers/sisters (log) . . . . . . . . . . . . .380** (.121)
2LL . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1,986 1,912
N . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1,531 1,531
Note.—Estimates from multiple imputation, five data sets (see text for details). SEs in parentheses.
a Omitted term is for Israel origin.
b Omitted term is for marriage before 1960.
c Indicator term for whether husband was a student during first three years of marriage.
d Indicator term for missing data on parental homes. See text for details.
* , two-tailed test.P ! .05
** .P ! .01
THE IMPACT OF PARENTAL WEALTH
Home Ownership at Marriage
First consider the full model in table 3 and ignore the ethnic terms. Col-
umn 2 reports the determinants of home ownership by a young couple
in the early years of marriage. The first four substantive regressors fol-
lowing the time period terms are measures of the young couple’s own
resources, which could cover at least part of the cost of financing an
apartment purchase. From among these variables the term for husband’s
education—a measure of human capital—is not statistically significant.
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TABLE 4
Determinants of Automobile Ownership, Schooling, and Subjective Standard












Constant . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7.185** (.884) 1.495* (.582)
Origin region:d
Western Europe . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .114 (.304) .041 (.207) .512 (.266)
Eastern Europe . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .020 (.273) .010 (.188) .508* (.237)
Africa . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .271 (.282) .261 (.208) .283 (.246)
Asia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .032 (.277) .556** (.206) .179 (.243)
Year of marriage (YOM):e
1960–69 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.047** (.333) .591** (.205) .424* (.192)
1970–78 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.082** (.321) .997** (.199) .466* (.186)
1979–86 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.613** (.330) 1.091** (.206) .357 (.198)
1984–94 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.112** (.347) 1.296** (.220) .705** (.221)
Human capital/employment:
Education—husband . . . . . . . . . . . . .077** (.025) .042* (.019)
Education—husband (i)f . . . . . . . . .085 (.155) .200 (.139)
No. spouses employed in
YOM . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .404** (.106) .327** (.092)
Age of husband in YOM . . . . . . . .056** (.016) .054** (.012) .039** (.013)
Parental socioeconomic status/ed-
ucation:g . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
SES—husband’s father
( ) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .2#10 .277 (.372) .007* (.003) .111 (.331)
SES—wife’s father ( ) . . . .2#10 1.232** (.360) .003 (.003) .699* (.317)
Education—husband’s
father . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .028* (.014)
Education—wife’s father . . . . . . . .069** (.014)
Parental resource terms:
No. parents alive in YOM . . . . . . .548* (.243) .083 (.181) .018 (.169)
No. parental homes . . . . . . . . . . . . . .441** (.102) .266** (.079) .213** (.084)
No. parental homes (i)h . . . . . . . . . .664** (.216) .216 (.172) .061 (.174)
No. brothers/sisters (log) . . . . . . . . .283* (.135) .389** (.102) .062 (.115)
2LL . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1,609 2,888 3,142
N . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1,531 1,531 1,531
Note.—Estimates from multiple imputation, five data sets (see text for details). SEs in parentheses.
a Logistic regression.
b Logistic regression. Dependent variable is the proportion going to school from among the two members
of the couple, formulated as a binomial model. See text for details.
c Ordered logit model. Cut points for the ordinal variable omitted from table.
d Omitted term is for Israel origin.
e Omitted term is for marriage before 1960.
f Indicator term for whether husband was a student during first three years of marriage.
g Socioeconomic status (SES) coded according to Vered scores for Israeli occupations (Kraus 1976).
h Indicator term for missing data on parental homes. See text for details.
* , two-tailed test.P ! .05
** .P ! .01
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This variable was introduced as a proxy for husband’s earnings capacity
at time of marriage, but it is probably a better indicator of earnings
potential in later life. As Ornstein (1976, p. 143) has noted, the labor
market income and occupational status of young workers are not well
differentiated by educational attainment. The indicator for husband’s
schooling during the first three years of marriage—a correction term to
pick up the effect from a possible mismeasurement of education—is also
insignificant, though it has the expected negative sign.
The remaining labor force variables—number of spouses employed in
the early years of marriage and age of husband—are better measures of
the income flow into a young household, and both are significant. Two-
earnings families and couples with older husbands have more resources
for a home purchase in the period following marriage. The coefficients
reported in the table are logits, but the odds ratios, obtained by expo-
nentiating the coefficients, provide a more easily interpretable metric.
These show that an additional employed spouse increases the odds of a
home purchase in the initial years of marriage by some 42%. Similarly,
each additional year in husband’s age raises the odds by 5%, reflecting
the likelihood that the husband has advanced in his career and has higher
income, as well as the financial savings that would accrue with age.
However, it is the parental resource variables that are the focus of our
interest. They are measured by number of parental homes when husband
and wife were each 16 and by number of siblings of husband and wife.
Not surprisingly, in light of the introductory comments about the impor-
tance in Israel of parental assistance in the home acquisition process, the
number of parental homes is highly significant and has a strong impact
on the odds of home ownership in the early years of marriage. Exponen-
tiating the logistic coefficient indicates that an increase of one parental
home raises the odds of ownership by 56%; an increase from zero to two
parental homes raises the odds by 143%. Thus, the consequence of pa-
rental wealth for the capability of a young couple to purchase a residence
early in their marital career is considerable. Note, incidentally, that this
effect is net of the fathers’ occupational terms, which are not significant.
The indicator term for missing data on parental home ownership is
also significant, with an odds ratio of 1.87. This says that where the
respondent or spouse did not live with parents at age 16, or where the
respondent declined to provide parental asset information, the odds of
home ownership at marriage are 87% greater than for couples where
neither set of parents was a home owner. Essentially, the missing data
population with respect to parental home ownership acts like couples
with an average of 1.41 parental homes ( ).[1.41][.4448]e p 1.87
This result is not surprising. The baseline group—couples with no pa-
rental homes—represents the poorest segment of the Israeli population in
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terms of parental assets. The missing data category, by comparison, con-
tains couples with substantial family resources who declined to respond
to the parental asset question, as well as couples where one set of parents
owned a home but his/her spouse did not live with parents at age 16 or
grew up in an institutional setting such as a displacement camp or a
kibbutz.
The second parental term—number of siblings of husband and wife—
was introduced as a measure of the demands on parental assets. Where
there are several siblings it is expected that the wider scope of parental
obligations will reduce the level of assistance provided to each child. This
expectation is borne out. The sibling term is significant and negative; with
four sibs—close to the median for husband plus wife in the Israeli pop-
ulation—an additional brother or sister reduces the odds of ownership by
8.2%.16 The final parental variable, number of living parents at time of
marriage, was not significant.17
To summarize: while the employment activity and accumulated savings
of a young couple make a discernible contribution to the likelihood of
home ownership in the early years of marriage, the effect of parental
wealth—even when imperfectly measured by number of parental homes
several years before the marriage—is massive. Young couples from fam-
ilies that have the resources to provide financial assistance are greatly
advantaged in their quest for early home acquisition. In the Israeli context,
in which there is little long-term rental housing, the estimates from equa-
tion (2) translate into a predicted home ownership probability of .49 and
.70 for young couples having zero and two parental homes, respectively,
but who are otherwise identical on the measured characteristics in the
regression. In short, parental wealth, as proxied by number of parental
homes, creates the possibility of an early transition to a stable residence
arrangement.
Automobile, Education, Subjective Living Standard
In Israel, an automobile is a luxury item since public transportation is
quite dependable in most sections of the country. Moreover, car prices are
high, as a result of steep import duties, and gasoline is expensive—as it
16 Since number of sibs is a logged term in the model, the multiplier effect is a function
of this number and was calculated as
b ln (N1) b ln (N) bexp / exp p [(N 1)/N] ,
where and the value of b was taken from table 3.Np 4
17 There were only 12 cases in which neither husband nor wife had a living parent at
the time of marriage. Consequently, this variable essentially serves as a contrast be-
tween one or both members of the couple having a living parent.
Impact of Parental Wealth on Early Living Standards in Israel
PROOF 17
is in much of Western Europe. Nonetheless, automobile ownership is
greatly valued by Israelis. It is also clear from appendix table A1 that
some 40% of young couples in our samples found the means to purchase
a car within their first three years of marriage.
In Column 1 of table 4 the determinants of automobile ownership are
examined. The parental effects are similar in pattern to those in the home
ownership regression: the odds of acquisition increase with parental
wealth and decline with number of siblings of husband and wife. What
is noteworthy in this equation is the greater importance of the labor market
terms, relative to the parental resource variables, as a factor in automobile
acquisition. Husband’s educational attainment is now significant, and the
other proxies for a couple’s earnings have marginally greater effects than
in the home ownership equation. The parental resource terms, by com-
parison, show no consistent difference in the two equations—though num-
ber of living parents now attains significance. We would like to interpret
the findings as suggesting that the financing of an automobile, since it is
a luxury item, comes more from the couple’s own resources than from
parental assets, but the results provide only weak evidence for this con-
tention; the parental resource effects remain considerable even in the case
of this nonessential item.
Whether or not formal education was continued by husband or wife
in the years immediately following marriage is examined in column 2 of
table 4. Since zero, one, or two spouses might have attended school, the
dependent variable is specified as binomial ( ) and estimated in GLMnp 2
with a logistic link function. With this formulation, the model describes
the proportion of the couple’s members attending school, expressed in the
log odds metric.
The present analysis also requires a different specification of the ex-
planatory variables from the preceding models. First, husband’s educa-
tional attainment in 1995 was dropped from the regressors because it can
hardly serve as a determinant of the dependent variable. Second, the
measure of work activity by husband and wife following marriage was
deleted because this represents an alternative use of time to schooling,
rather than standing as a determinant of formal study. Third, in con-
formity with the stratification literature, terms for the educational attain-
ment of husband’s and wife’s fathers were added; these proxy the extent
to which educational attainment was encouraged in a parental household
and are well established as causal links in the achievement of offspring
(e.g., Blau and Duncan 1967). With this revised formulation we address
the impact of parental wealth on the decision to continue schooling, net
of the contribution of parental values.
Observe, first, that parents’ education and occupational status have the
effects expected of them. The educational attainments of both husband’s
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and wife’s fathers are statistically significant. The same is true for hus-
band’s father’s SES, though the comparable term for wife’s father is not
significant. With the exception of the last, these results replicate estab-
lished findings (e.g., Jencks et al. 1972; Featherman and Stevens 1982).
Age of husband at marriage is also significant and negative; not surpris-
ingly, a late marriage reduces the odds of attending school because desired
schooling is likely to have already been completed. Turning to the parental
resource proxies—number of parental homes and sibship size—both are
significant with the expected signs: number of parental homes increases
the likelihood of study; sibship size depresses the prospects of additional
schooling.
A comparison of the relative importance of socialization and home
environment versus parental wealth is informative. If the educational
attainments of husbands’ and wife’s fathers were each raised by four
years (treated here as independent effects)—e.g., from high school com-
pletion to college graduation—this would translate into a 48% increase
in the odds of study by the young couple. A change from zero to two
parental homes, by comparison, has a somewhat greater impact: an im-
provement of 70% in the odds. The conclusion, then, is that home en-
vironment and parental resources both play a considerable role in the
decision to continue with schooling—the latter effect, however, has not
been adequately recognized in the stratification literature.
Respondents were also asked to rate their standard of living during the
first three years of marriage, relative to the average living standard in
Israel; this subjective measure ranges from “1,” very low, to “5,” very high.
A subjective measure is a very different sort of beast from the three
objective items we have thus far examined. It requires a judgment by the
respondent about the average living standard in the country, as well as
an assessment of his/her own quality of life. Moreover, the latter is vul-
nerable to individual dispositions to see oneself as middle-class and suc-
cessful or, possibly, as disadvantaged and deprived.
With these caveats, we report in column 3 of table 4 a model of the
determinants of the subjective living standard. Because of the ranked
categorical structure of this dependent variable, ordered logit regression
was employed. The results are largely consistent with the earlier findings.
Husband’s education and the other proxies for household income in the
early years of marriage are significant and positive, as is the parental
wealth measure, number of parental homes. Number of siblings, does not,
however, have a significant effect.
To summarize the preceding material: In all of the regressions the proxy
for parental wealth was statistically significant, often having a substantial
effect on the dependent variable. Number of siblings—introduced to ob-
tain a refined assessment of the parental resources available for transfer
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in that it measures competing demands for the resources—has the ex-
pected (negative) sign and is significant in three of the four regressions;
indeed, in all the equations with objective measures. Thus, in combination,
the four models make clear that parental wealth plays a considerable role
in the living standards of young couples in Israel, enhancing their like-
lihood of car ownership, engaging in study, and, most importantly, ac-
quiring a residence. Moreover, these effects are net of parental occupa-
tional status and the proxies for household income of the couple.
A comment on the time period dummies. In the home ownership and
subjective living standard equations there is no discernible pattern,
whereas in the equations for automobile ownership and schooling there
is a clear trend to higher rates of acquisition over time. These findings
can be understood from the point of view that home ownership has been
a necessity throughout the country’s history, whereas an automobile is a
luxury item, more frequently acquired in recent years as median family
income in Israel has increased. Education shows the same trend as au-
tomobile ownership, but the time path is less steep, especially after the
initial period. Possibly schooling was once viewed as a luxury item, when
household incomes were low. But it is also the case that the number of
colleges and universities in Israel has expanded over time, in excess of
the rate of population growth, permitting a larger proportion of young
adults to contemplate advanced study and enroll in institutions of higher
education.
Ethnic Effects
The ethnic dimension constitutes a major fault line in Israeli society.
Ethnicity, defined in terms of continent and, sometimes, country of origin,
has been a basis for political mobilization in the country and is associated
with distinct differences in educational attainment, household income,
and living standards (Cohen and Haberfeld 1998; Shavit 1984; Smooha
and Kraus 1985). A discussion of the ethnic effects was deferred until the
full model of the determination of early living standards could be explored.
We now turn to an examination of the ethnic disparities. The question
of interest concerns the extent to which they can be attributed to differ-
ences in parental financial resources, net of the human capital endowments
and the employment status of young couples.
For simplicity, we consider the ethnic gap to equal the largest difference
between the ethnic terms in an equation. Regarding home ownership,
from column 1 of table 3 we compute the gap to equal .953 (in the logit
metric)—the difference between Western European and African origin
Israelis. Introduction of controls for the human capital/employment ex-
periences of husband and wife and for the parental SES terms (not shown)
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lowers the gap to .890—a reduction of 7% from the initial disparity.
Addition of the parental resource variables further reduces the disparity
by 44%, to .500 (column 2 of table 3). With regard to the gap in early
home ownership, we therefore conclude that differences between the eth-
nic groups in parental financial resources are by far the more important
factor, accounting for some 86% of the reduction from the initial ethnic
disparity.
In table 5 we report the ethnic gaps for the various living standard
measures, before and after introduction of controls for the human capital/
employment/parental SES terms and the parental resource variables; the
gaps were calculated from the ethnic effects in tables 3 and 4 and from
models analogous to that in column 1 of table 3. With respect to car
ownership, the larger percentage reduction in the ethnic gap is again
effected by the parental resource variables, possibly because the outlay
necessary to acquire a car, as well as a home, can be substantial, often
exceeding the financial assets accumulated by a young couple.
Parental wealth appears to play less of a role in explaining the ethnic
gap in schooling; however, the parental characteristics in column 2 of
table 4 include proxies for home environment and, therefore, are not
strictly comparable to the other equations. Possibly, parental resources
are less consequential because tuition costs have not been high in Israel;
possibly because the decision to continue schooling heavily reflects cultural
orientation, which is partially captured by the ethnic terms. Yet, even in
the case of schooling, some 34% of the reduction in gap size can be
attributed to differences in parental assets among the groups.
Last, with regard to the subjective measure, there is little reduction in
the initial ethnic gap, either from the human capital variables or from
the parental resource terms. As suggested earlier, it is not clear how re-
spondents interpreted this question or how the appraisals of perceived
living standards relate to ethnicity. In this regard, note that, in contrast
with the other living standard measures, it is the Israel origin group (the
omitted ethnic term) that reports the lowest subjective assessment of its
living standard, rather than one of the objectively more deprived groups,
either Asian or African descendants.
To summarize, in all the equations with objective measures of living
standard (table 3; cols. 1 and 2 of table 4), the largest ethnic gap is between
Ashkenazim (Europeans) and Mizrachim (Middle Eastern origin Israelis):
a well-documented cleavage in Israeli society. In the instances of material
assets (home, auto), the gap in ownership rate is largely explained by
ethnic disparities in parental resources and demands on the resources—
European origin parents have larger asset holdings and fewer children
computing for the resources. In the case of schooling, a similar advantage
is found for Europeans, relative to Israelis from a Middle Eastern back-
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TABLE 5
Ethnic Disparities in Living Standard, First Three Years of Marriage
Ethnic Gap












Initial disparity* . . . . . . . . . . . . .953 1.110 1.242 .480
Addition of human capital/
employment and paren-
tal SES† . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .890 .717 .817 .398
Addition of parental re-
source terms‡ . . . . . . . . . . . . . .500 .385 .597 .333
* Largest disparity between ethnic terms in equation (1) of table 3. Corresponding regressions for table
4 measures not shown.
† Regressions not shown. In the schooling equation terms are also present for the educational attainment
of husband’s and wife’s fathers.
‡ Largest ethnic disparity in equation (2) of table 3 and in models of table 4.
ground. Yet, while disparities in parental assets contribute to the schooling
gap, the primary factors in this instance appear to be noneconomic and
derive from home environment and childhood socialization.
EARLY LIVING STANDARDS AS AN UNOBSERVED CONSTRUCT
There is value in also considering a model in which the living-standard
construct is represented as an unobserved variable with several indicators.
This formulation would capture the possibility that parental assistance is
allocated differently among young couples, reflecting the diversity of their
needs and desires—a home in one instance, a car or schooling expenses
in a different household. A formulation using a single living-standard
construct would lessen the confounding of lifestyle choice with level of
consumption, since the various expenditure categories would be consid-
ered simultaneously.
This formulation can be represented as a MIMIC model (multiple in-
dicators, multiple causes) in which a couple’s parental wealth, along with
proxies for household income at time of marriage, are seen as influencing
the living-standard construct. This unobserved variable, in turn, is iden-
tified by its loadings on several living standard indicators. The equations
for the MIMIC model are (Joreskog and Sorbom 1989, p. 173),
Yp lh , (3)
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′hp g X z, (4)
where Y is a vector of indicators of the latent variable h, is a vector ofl
factor loadings relating the indicators to the latent variable, X is a vector
of the exogenous “causes” of h, and is a coefficient vector. The ’s andg
z’s are assumed to be mutually uncorrelated. Because the indicators of
the living-standard construct are categorical variables, estimation is by
weighted least squares.
The results from this estimation are presented in table 6. The unob-
served construct is identified by three indicators: home ownership, car
ownership, and subjective standard of living in the first three years of
marriage. The fourth consumption indicator available to us, schooling
after marriage, was not used as it requires a causal structure that is
different from the other consumption variables (see col. 2 of table 4). To
establish the scale of the latent variable, the loading of the home ownership
indicator was set to one.
Turning to the column 2 equation, which has the same regressors as
the prior models, we find a causal structure that reflects the main thrust
of the single indicator equations: husband’s human capital and the
couple’s employment status have a significant effect on living standards;
but, net of these terms, the parental resource variables have an equivalent
impact. An increase of one parental home, for example, raises the value
of the standard of living construct by .134 units (in this arbitrary metric),
somewhat larger than the effect from an additional employed spouse
(.094).
Also noteworthy are the year of marriage dummies and the ethnic terms.
There is clear evidence in column 2 of a higher living standard in the
initial years of marriage as we move forward in time; this presumably
reflects the secular trend in economic development in Israel. As for the
ethnic terms, they permit an account of the extent to which the ethnic
gap in the summary living-standard measure can be explained by the
various sets of variables. In particular, the initial maximum disparity,
between Western European and African origin Israelis, is equal to .192
(column 1 of table 6). Introduction of controls for the human capital/
employment experiences of the couple and for the parental SES terms
(not shown) lowers the gap to .169—a reduction of 12% from the initial
disparity. Addition of the parental resource terms reduces the disparity
by a further 43%, to .097 (column 2 of table 6). Analogous to our earlier
assessment, we conclude that the differences in parental resources among
the ethnic groups is by far the more important factor in early living
standards, accounting for some 76% of the reduction in gap size.
A final note on the models in table 6. Structural equation modeling
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TABLE 6






marriage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.000 1.000 1.000
Car ownership at
marriage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.901** (.573) 3.034** (.364) 2.027** (.224)
Subjective standard of
living . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.166** (.163) 1.018** (.131) .939** (.115)
Regressors:
Origin region:a
Western Europe . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .064 (.045) .037 (.057)
Eastern Europe . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .036 (.041) .005 (.052)
Africa . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .128** (.045) .060 (.055)
Asia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .052 (.041) .007 (.054)
Year of marriage (YOM):b
1960–69 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .198** (.044) .188** (.051)
1970–78 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .349** (.056) .364** (.058)
1979–86 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .452** (.068) .442** (.065)
1984–94 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .571** (.083) .538** (.074)
Human capital/employment:
Education—husband . . . . . . . . . . . . .015** (.005) .029** (.006)
Education—husband (i)c . . . . . . . . .027 (.030) .015 (.038)
No. spouses employed in
YOM . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .094** (.022) .126** (.029)
Age of husband in YOM . . . . . . . .014** (.003) .030** (.004)
Parental socioeconomic status:
SES husband’s father
( ) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .2#10 .017 (.070) .040 (.087)
SES wife’s father ( ) . . . . . .2#10 .221** (.071) .273** (.092)
Parental resources:
No. parents alive in
YOM . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .084* (.036) .201** (.048)
No. parental homes . . . . . . . . . . . . . .101** (.022) .209** (.030)
No. parental homes (i)d . . . . . . . . . .134** (.042) .221** (.054)
No. brothers/sisters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .069** (.026) .052* (.027)
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .2x /df 62.45/16 111.90/36 48.12/20
N . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1,531 1,531 1,531
Fit indices:
CFI . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .918 .890 .942
TLI . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .862 .826 .904
RMSEA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .043 .037 .030
Note.—Estimates from multiple imputation, five data sets (see text for details). SEs in parentheses.
a Omitted term is for Israel origin.
b Omitted term is for marriage before 1960.
c Indicator term for whether husband was a student during first three years of marriage.
d Indicator term for missing data on parental homes. See text for details.
* , two-tailed test.P ! .05
** .P ! .01
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(SEM) estimation minimizes the discrepancy between the covariance ma-
trix of observed variables and the model implied covariance matrix. This
approach permits tests of model fit, based on the discrepancy between
the two matrices. According to the common fit indices, reported in table
6, the first two equations do not adequately reproduce the observed co-
variance matrix. However, if the model is trimmed by dropping the ethnic
and time period terms (equation 3) a satisfactory fit is obtained—the CFI
and TLI indices each exceed 0.9 and the RMSEA value is below .05.
For our purposes, however, the former models are more informative
about the determination of living standards in Israel, in that they permit
a discussion of the ethnic and time period effects. Note, also, that the
qualitative findings implied by equation (3), the statistically preferred
model, are identical to those drawn from equation (2). For these reasons
we have focused on equations (1) and (2) in this account.
CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS FOR SOCIAL POLICY
Parental resources and, presumably, transfers of resources—-though the
latter process was not examined directly—have had a massive impact on
the living standards of young Israelis. They are critical factors in early
home ownership and automobile acquisition, as well as in the likelihood
of school attendance after marriage. This is the case even with controls
present for parental SES and indicators of the earnings capacity and
financial savings of the young couple. While our data are limited to a few
aspects of living standards, because the measures that were examined tap
different dimensions of this construct and because the findings are con-
sistent across measures, we suggest that the consequence of parental asset
holdings for living standards and life chances is quite pervasive.
At one level these results are not surprising. We expect children from
wealthier homes to have access to greater financial resources and to live
more comfortably than offspring from poor families. Indeed, parental
background effects on educational attainment and early socioeconomic
achievement were documented as far back as Blau and Duncan (1967,
chap. 5). What this study adds to the established formulation is a con-
sideration of the role of parental wealth. The value of this extension is
that it permits an examination of the effects of direct transfers of financial
and material resources across generations. In the Israeli case these effects
are considerable.
The essential point is that, in Israel, parental wealth makes a huge
difference for acquiring the basic ingredients of a modest living standard:
a residence, a car, schooling. This is to be contrasted with the possible
contribution of parental wealth to the acquisition of luxury items: a pres-
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tige auto, a vacation home, the opportunity to drink fine wine. In short,
the issue is not whether parental wealth confers an advantage, but at
what point in the continuum of living standards it becomes a critical
resource. In Israel, a recognition of the necessity of parental aid for main-
taining even a modest lifestyle is apparent in the expressions reported in
table 1.
A comparison of the Israeli context with the opportunities of young
adults in the United States to establish a “middle class” living standard
can be illuminating. In the United States a well-educated young couple,
even a couple from poor origin families, can expect to live comfortably
on its labor market earnings upon school completion. It is possible to rent
an attractive apartment and purchase an auto solely from earnings, es-
pecially if both spouses are employed. Indeed, in the United States, to a
considerable extent, the decision to rent or purchase housing is a lifestyle
choice. However, as noted, this is not the case in Israel because of the
absence of a rental market. Young Israeli couples are compelled to pur-
chase, and the role of parental resources in facilitating the acquisition is
considerable. In our data, the home ownership rate in the initial three
years of marriage closely tracks our proxy for parental wealth—the rate
is 42%, 57%, and 69% for couples with zero, one, and two parental homes
(table 2).
In Israel, moreover, early home ownership is not just a living standard
consideration. Because of restrictions on currency transfers and invest-
ment in foreign assets (which have been relaxed only recently), and be-
cause of the absence of a local stock market during much of the country’s
history, the principal vehicle of wealth accumulation has been residence
purchases. Since housing values have climbed more steeply than the in-
flation rate, the acquisition of a home shortly after marriage has meant
a greater number of years in which a couple might grow its resource base.
As a consequence, the possibility of early home ownership, facilitated by
parental assistance, has operated to magnify the existing disparity between
the resources of the poor and the more affluent, as family assets are
transmitted from one generation to the next.
This replication of advantage across generations has served to reinforce
deep-rooted ethnic cleavages in Israeli society. In our data, Israelis of
North African heritage own homes that have an average value of $133,000
(1995 values, U.S. dollars) versus $181,000 for European origin Israelis.18
18 Home value data were collected in terms of five dollar categories: U.S. dollars are
the currency of apartment sales in Israel. In computing home value figures, the brack-
eted categories were assigned their mean values; the low end category (less than
$75,000) was assigned the value $50,000 and the high end, open category (greater than
$300,000) was assigned the value $400,000. The sensitivity of results to alternate as-
signments of the open-ended categories was examined and found to be minimal, pre-
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Also, the average number of children in families with completed child-
bearing is 4.2 for the former group, 2.7 for the latter.19 Thus, Israelis from
European backgrounds are at a considerable advantage in regard to the
parental resources potentially available for transfer to a child. Nor is it
evident, especially in the absence of estate taxation,20 that this advantage
can be eroded by the sorts of policies commonly instituted to uplift poor
families: investments in schooling and human capital in the hope of nar-
rowing the earnings gap. Because of the critical role of household wealth
and the difficulty of asset accumulation from earnings in Israel, it is not
clear that the ethnic disparity in living standards can be much reduced
by a focus on educational attainment and skills deficits. The gap in house-
hold wealth, it must be remembered, captures the cumulative impact of
past inequalities in household income and transfers, and it is resilient to
rapid change via policies that seek to modify the incremental contributions
to wealth by way of savings from earned income.
What implications can be drawn for the United States from this anal-
ysis? One cannot facilely assume that the institutional arrangements that
have heightened the importance of parental wealth for young couples in
Israel have a counterpart in the United States. Indeed, we have stressed
the particular role of the housing market and liquidity constraints, for
which there is little analogy in this country.21 At the same time, there are
developments of a different sort in the United States that may inflate the
role of parental wealth. Since the early 1970s, the average family income
of household heads under age 25 has declined by some 23% (Mishel,
Bernstein, and Schmitt 1999, p. 45). This erosion is probably responsible
for the failure of the home ownership rate of young adults in the United
States to keep pace with the overall ownership rate (Wolff 2001, p. 57).
Unlike in Israel, there is an alternative of rental housing: however, the
decline in the ownership rate by this age cohort, relative to older house-
holds, can be interpreted as an indicator of growing economic distress
among young families.
At the same time, since the 1970s there has been an increase in both
the income and net worth of U.S. citizens in the age group 55–64—
sumably because some 91% of respondents reported housing values that fell into a
closed bracketed category.
19 Computations from the survey, based on women 45 and older.
20 The issue of estate taxation, as part of a reform of the income tax system, has been
on the agenda of recent Israeli governments, though no revision has yet been adopted.
21 Yet, even in the United States, with low interest, long-term mortgages readily avail-
able, there is some evidence of parental wealth effects on early home ownership. For
example, Mayer and Engelhardt (1996, p. 67) report that among first-time home buyers
transfer recipients were six months younger and purchased a home worth $60,000
more than nonrecipients’, though both groups had virtually identical incomes.
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presumably the parents of the aforementioned, younger cohort (Mishel et
al. 1999, p. 45; Wolff 2001, p. 57). Thus, although little attention has been
given to the possibility of a growing financial dependency of young fam-
ilies on the assets of their parents, the preceding developments raise this
prospect. They point to a strengthening of the linkage between parental
resources and the living standards of young families; in short, to a tight-
ening in the replication of inequality across generations.
There also are broader trends that are likely to heighten the importance
of household wealth in the United States—in regard to its service as a
store of potential consumption as well as a factor in the transmission of
inequality. In particular, the weakening of the social safety net, which has
been in progress for some years, will necessarily mean that much of the
risk from economic dislocation will be shifted from the public realm to
the household unit. Families can reduce their vulnerability by increasing
savings, which could be used to smooth consumption in a context of
income fluctuation, or they can share risk with others: commonly parents
and relatives. Young couples, however, tend to have little in the way of
savings at this life stage; hence the contraction in public welfare programs
is likely to further increase their reliance on the resources of parents.
The present analysis carries implications, as well, for the modeling of
stratification processes. A consideration of intergenerational effects has
long been a central theme in stratification research. However, the inter-
generational transmissions have commonly been framed in terms of pa-
rental education and occupational status as the sole parental resources
requiring consideration. Such a formulation makes sense as long as the
measures of interest are the schooling and labor force attainments of
offspring—outcomes heavily influenced by parental investments when the
child is young and resides in the parental household. However, if attention
is shifted to issues of the economic well-being and living standards of
adult children, we would do well to incorporate measures of parental
wealth into the formulation of parental resources.
This is desirable for two reasons. First, parental assets do eventually
get transferred and make a contribution to living standards, along with
a child’s own earnings. Second, parental transfers are often made stra-
tegically and allocated over much of the life course—to facilitate the
attainment of specific goals (e.g., the purchase of a home, opening a small
business) or to protect offspring at a time of financial crisis (e.g., illness,
job loss). See Spilerman and Torche (in press) for evidence of such effects
in Chile. As such, the incorporation of parental asset holdings into the
stratification paradigm would illuminate the intricate financial linkages
that take place between generations, along with the specific ways by which
parents target transfers to enhance the economic security and living stan-
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dards of children, beyond investments made early in the life course in
their stock of human capital.
APPENDIX
TABLE A1
Descriptive Statistics for the Explanatory Variables
Variable Mean SD % Missing
Standard of living measures:
Home ownership . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .601 .490 2
Auto ownership . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .401 .490 1
Number in school . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .452 .681 1
Subjective standard of living . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.834 .761 1
Origin region:
Israel . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .060 .238 1
Western Europe . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .121 .327 1
Eastern Europe . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .332 .471 1
Africa . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .239 .426 1
Asia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .247 .431 1
Year of marriage (YOM):
Before 1960 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .125 .331 0
1960–69 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .216 .411 0
1970–78 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .272 .445 0
1979–86 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .215 .411 0
1984–94 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .171 .376 0
Human capital/employment:
Education—husband . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12.313 3.456 1
Education—husband (i)* . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .236 .425 1
No. spouses employed in YOM . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.483 .588 1
Age of husband in YOM . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25.470 4.226 2
Parental characteristics:† . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
SES—husband’s father . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42.612 18.522 8
SES—wife’s father . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42.540 18.332 8
Education—husband’s father . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8.140 5.307 30
Education—wife’s father . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8.570 5.051 24
Parental resources:
No. parents alive in YOM . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.897 .327 1
No. parental homes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.380 .744 19
No. parental homes (7i)‡ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .194 .395 0
No. brothers/sisters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6.820 4.440 1
Note.— .Np 1,531
* Indicator term for whether husband was a student during first three years of marriage.
† Imputed means for the education of husband’s and wife’s fathers are, respectively, 7.74 and 8.18,
somewhat lower than the observed means. However, these values are consistent with other information
about the parents; e.g., husbands’ fathers have an average SES of 38.8 in cases where educational
attainment is missing, versus 44.3 where data on father’s education is present.
‡ Indicator term for missing data.
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QUERIES TO THE AUTHOR
1 I believe I edited the abstract previously, but if so it disappeared
along the way. I have restored it to the text here with the following
changes: since AJS abstracts are limited to 100 to 125 words, I have cut
the last sentence of the abstract. “State of Israel” in first sentence becomes
simply “Israel.”
2 See footnote 6 to determine if the mention of Federal News Service
(formerly cited in References, but moved, with your OK, because it is a
web address) has been correctly done.
3 See the last date (“1984 to 1994”) of YOM in tables 3, 4, and 6. Should
this be “1987 to 1994” (I use “to” rather than a hyphen, which can’t be
expressed in these queries.)
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